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STATE v. BELLE ISLE CAB CO.
PEDESTRIAN RIGHT OF WAY AND LAST CLEAR
CHANCE - "SAFETY ISLAND" AND
"CROSS-WALK"
State v. Belle Isle Cab Company1
This was an appeal from a directed verdict in favor of all
the defendants in a wrongful death action. The fatal acci-
dent occurred when the pedestrian, plaintiff's decedent,
alighted from a streetcar on a safety zone and attempted to
cross the street in the darkness of early morning. The plain-
tiff's decedent was not in the pedestrian's cross walk and
when about three-quarters of the way across the street, he
was struck by an ice truck, thrown to the ground and sub-
sequently run over by a taxi cab. On appeal, held, judg-
ment affirmed as to the driver of the ice truck but reversed
as to the driver and owner of the taxi cab. One Judge dis-
sented in part and contended that both directed verdicts
should be reversed.
The facts disclosed that the accident had occurred at the
intersection of North and Pennsylvania Avenues in Balti-
more City when the pedestrian left a safety island on the
southwest corner and proceeded with the green light to the
northwest corner. The ice truck and the taxi were proceed-
ing westward on North Avenue, and the traffic light had
changed by-the time the two vehicles reached Pennsylvania
Avenue and proceeded to cross the intersection. The pedes-
trian was about at the northernmost rail of the west bound
car tracks on North Avenue when he was struck by the
truck whose driver testified that he had been driving at a
speed of twenty-five to thirty miles per hour and that the
pedestrian was three yards in front of him when first
observed. The driver of the taxi which had been at the
right and to the rear of the truck testified that his head-
lights picked up the body of a man lying across the road
when twenty or twenty-five feet away, that he put on the
brakes but skidded and ran over the recumbent pedestrian.
However, the police officer testified that there was a forty-
two foot skid mark leading up to the front wheels of the
taxi. The deceased had been pinned underneath the car,
and the skid mark was over thirteen feet from the north
curb line of North Avenue.
In discussing any liability on the part of the truck
driver, the Court of Appeals noted that there was an obliga-
171 A. 2d 435 (Md., 1950).
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tion on the driver to give the right of way to any person
who had already started to cross in the pedestrian's cross
walk, but stressed the fact that this obligation was only
applicable when the pedestrian is using the defined right
of way to cross the street.2 There were no marked cross
marks at this crossing, but when the pedestrian was struck,
he was not in the space between the extension of the build-
ing line of Pennsylvania Avenue and the extension of the
curb line which would have designated the pedestrian's
right of way.' Within this space pedestrians have the right
of way, and outside of this space vehicles have the right of
way.4 In the instant case the plaintiff's decedent had not
yet reached the cross walk, and there was no evidence that
the truck driver could have seen him until he was approxi-
mately three yards in front of the truck.
In affirming the directed verdict in favor of the truck
driver, the Court stated:
"The tFruck driver was not bound to anticipate that a
pedestrian would cross the street between cross walks,
and whether or not the deceased had the green light
when he started, if the truck driver did not see him
until too late to stop, we are unable to find that the
truck driver was guilty of any negligence."5
However, in discussing the status of the taxi, the Court
found a possible application of the last clear chance dqoc-
trine and held that the question of negligence in this in-
stance should be decided by the jury. It was reasoned that
any negligence on the part of the pedestrian in this instance
continued only until he was lying prostrate in the street.
It was at that time that the taxi driver saw him and under
these circumstances it was then to be determined whether
the driver had an opportunity to avoid striking the recum-
bent figure. In its reversal, the Court of Appeals considered
the lengthy skid marks and also the wide space to the right
in which the taxi might have turned, in determining that
the question of negligence should be left to the jury.
The dissenting opinion took the view that there were no
authorities which outlawed a passenger marooned on a
safety island from taking the most direct route of escape,
2 Chasanow v. Smouse, i6S Md. 629, 632, 178 A. 846 (1935); Legum v.
State, 167 Md. 339, 173 A. 056 (1934).8 Md. Code Supp. (1947). Art. 661/, Sec. 2, Subsec. (:1) (9). See also: Bond
v. Forthuber, 84 A. 2d 886 (Md., 1951) and Johnny's Cabs v. Miller, 85 A. 2d
439 (TMd., 1952).
'Md. Code Supp. (1947), Art. 66%/2, See. 181.
I Supra, n. 1, 437.
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and since the pedestrian relied on a green light in crossing,
the question of negligence as to the truck driver should also
go to the jury. It was contended that by construing several
statutory provisions, the street car passenger was deprived
of the protection he had at common law.
There are two distinctive features which set the case
apart from the ordinary negligence case involving the
striking of a pedestrian by a motor vehicle: (1) the Court
itself rationalized computations involving speed, distance
and skid marks; and (2), it extended, in a dicta, the doc-
trine of the last clear chance.
In regard to the skid marks, the Court went into some
detail to negative the testimony of the taxi driver that he
had been going between fifteen and twenty miles per hour
and had not seen the pedestrian until he was twenty or
twenty-five feet away. Since the driver had testified that
he had skidded over the deceased and pushed him three or
four feet, the Court deducted the four feet from the total
skid mark of forty-two feet, and it was assumed that the
beginning of the skid mark was made by the rear wheel
and the end by the front wheel (of which there was no
evidence). It was also assumed that the distance between
the wheels was approximately ten feet (of which there was
no evidence) and thus, deducting the fourteen feet from
the total skid mark of forty-two feet, it was reasoned that
the brakes must have been applied when the taxi was
twenty-eight feet from the prostrate form of the pedestrian.
In determining when the taxi driver first saw the pedes-
trian, some extra distance was added to compensate for
the feet traveled by the taxi after the driver saw the
figure but before the wheels began to skid. It was not
estimated exactly how far this would be, but it was noted
that no matter how quick the driver's reflexes, the car
must have traveled some distance after the eye observed
the figure and before the brakes caused the tires to skid.
This space added to that shown by the skid marks made it
apparent that the driver saw the pedestrian when he was
at least several car lengths away. In addition the Court
observed that the driver had thirteen feet to his right in
which he might have turned and concluded that the ques-
tion of negligence in this instance was one for the jury.
In many Maryland automobile accident cases, skid
marks have been introduced in evidence in an attempt to
raise an inference of excessive speed, but as a rule very
little is done to translate skid marks into approximations
1953]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
of miles per hour or to estimate the distance between the
driver and the object struck at the point the driver testifies
that he first observed it. Bozman v. State,' is a typical case
in which skid marks were used merely to show evidence of
excessive speed. There the driver swore that he was driv-
ing between thirty-five and forty miles per hour when he
saw the plaintiff's infant son at a distance of about seventy-
five feet. The driver further testified that he put on the
brakes immediately, pulled to the left and had almost
stopped when he struck the child. The defendant driver
requested a directed verdict, but in view of the fact that
the skid marks started fifteen feet south of the point of
impact and extended diagonally seventy-five feet to the
rear wheels of the automobile, the Court stated that exces-
sive speed could be inferred.7 There was no need to make
special calculations here as the skid marks were very
lengthy under the circumstances. Another case, Jackson v.
Forwood, stated that long skid marks indicated the driver
of the automobile did not have his car under control. Again
no special calculations were made as the skid marks were
grossly excessive under the circumstances. The principal
case went a step further than the previous cases and demon-
strated a relationship between the skid marks and the dis-
stance that was covered according to testimony.
Until 1933 the Court of Appeals had made little calcula-
tion in automobile collision cases with regard to compara-
tive speeds, distances and time, but Paolini v. Western Mill
& Lumber Corp.' marked a new trend.10 This was the first
case in which the Court employed a mathematical formula
to arrive at the speed of one of two vehicles involved in an
accident at an intersection. It is true that this case involved
no skid marks, but the case is significant because of the
aforementioned feature. This type of calculation has been
criticized on the ground that the premises upon which they
are founded vary with the accuracy of the testimony.11
However, if skid marks are properly measured following
an accident, it would seem that much of this error could
be eliminated. It is true that few people can accurately
:177 Md. 151, 9 A. 2d 60 (1939).
'Ibid, 155:
"The skidding of an automobile after a collision is also a circum-
stance of evidential value in reference to the rate of speed or whether
the machine was under control."
8186 Md. 379, 47 A. 2d 81 (1946).
9 165 Md. 45, 166 A. 2d 609 (1933).
10 Due and Bishop, Automobile Right of Way, 11 Md. L. Rev. 159, 169
(1950).
u Ibid, 170.
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judge speed and distance, but if accurately measured skid
marks become the premise of the calculations, it would
seem that the computations would be even more valuable
in this type of case. The instant case is the first in which
the Court of Appeals uses the skid marks together with the
testimony and calculates the distance between the driver
and the object struck at the time it was first observed. In
a very recent case, Johnny's Cabs v. Miller,12 it was held
that skid marks of only nine feet are not necessarily evi-
dence of speed of over fifteen or twenty miles per hour
(even though the pedestrian's body was thrown 54 feet)
and the principal case was cited as authority. Whether con-
sidering skid marks along with testimony and ascertaining
approximate distances and speeds with a few simple calcu-
lations is a sound method of employing this evidence would
seem to depend upon how much information the court has
of the extent to which the length of the skid mark is
affected by atmospheric conditions, the surface of the street,
the kind of rubber in the tire of the car and all such factors
which might affect the marks made on the street.
The doctrine of the last clear chance has been employed
in several unusual situations in Maryland to enable a plain-
tiff, himself guilty of contributory negligence, to recover,
and the principal case extends the doctrine in a dicta. The
majority of the Court in the instant case started with the
premise that if there had been any contributory negligence
on the part of the pedestrian, it continued only until the end
of the impact with the ice truck when he was lying pros-
trate in the street. Hence, the contributory negligence, if
any, ceased at that moment; and yet the Court in discussing
the status of the taxicab stated that there was a possible
application of the doctrine of the last clear chance, and in
support of this contention cited Jendrzejewski v. Baker.13
However, that case held that the doctrine of the last clear
chance was not applicable as there was no evidence in the
case that the defendant by the exercise of ordinary care
and caution saw the plaintiff in time to avoid the accident. 14
The doctrine of the last clear chance is generally stated
as follows:
". .. the contributory negligence of the injured
person will not defeat recovery if defendant, by exer-
1Supra, n. 3.
"182 Md. 41, 31 A. 2d 611 (1943).
-Ibid, 46.
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cise of ordinary care, might have avoided the conse-
quence of the injured person's negligence...,,1"
It is generally conceded that all of the necessary elements
of the doctrine must be present in order to bring it into
play, and if any element is absent the case is governed
by the ordinary rules of negligence and contributory negli-
gence. Thus it can be seen that the doctrine presupposes
negligence on the part of the injured person. In the
instant case, therefore, the application of the doctrine by
the majority presupposes that this prior negligence has left
the pedestrian in a helpless position from which, with the
exercise of reasonable care, he cannot escape. If the
driver of the cab discovers the pedestrian's danger in time
to avoid injury by using ordinary care, he is said to have
the last clear chance and may be held liable for the subse-
quent injury notwithstanding the plaintiff's prior negli-
gence. The most usual explanation of liability is that the
defendant's negligence after he discovers the plaintiff's peril
is a "wilful" or "wanton" wrong.
The dissenting opinion noted that there was a lack of
contributory negligence, and hence no possibility of an
application of the doctrine and remarked:
"The confused subject of 'last clear chance' becomes
only more confused if applied outside of its proper
field."' 6
Stafford v. Zake" was an interesting negligence case in
which the Court refused to infer excessive speed on the
part of the defendant but did approve a prayer containing
the last clear chance doctrine. A girl of seven had been
playing in a narrow alley and ran across in front of an
oncoming truck. When almost across the alley she was
warned of the truck, decided to run back and was struck
by the right fender of the defendant's vehicle. The Court
of Appeals considered the evidence that children frequently
played in the alley, that the truck driver frequently used
the alley and had just seen a boy run across and concluded
that the question of the driver's negligence on a last clear
chance to avoid the accident was properly for the jury. In
view of the fact that the alley was only 11.8 feet wide and
the truck 7.5 feet wide, this seems a strange application
65 C. J. S., Negligence, Sec. 136, pp. 756-7.
"Supra. n. 1, 441.
"179 Md. 460, 20A. 2d 144 (1941).
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of the doctrine as there was little the driver could do
except to apply the brakes when he saw the child, but
the lower court's ruling was not disturbed, and a verdict
for the plaintiff wai affirmed.
Another Maryland case' s illustrates a difference in
opinion between the judges of the Court of Appeals in
regard to the application of the doctrine. In this case the
plaintiff had started to cross a street with the green light
and got to the center of the street, when an automobile,
held up by a traffic light, stopped in front of him on the
crossing line with another car immediately in the rear.
The pedestrian stopped there and was hit by a truck coming
around the corner from another street. The plaintiff
had looked in that direction when he had started to cross
the street but had not continued to do so. The plaintiff's
second prayer embodying the doctrine was approved by
a majority of the Court.19 The writer of the opinion failed
to find the plaintiff guilty of any negligence and did not
think the doctrine was appropriate on the additional
ground that there was not time after the driver discovered
the plaintiff's peril to avoid striking him. Thus it can be
seen that the subject of last clear chance, when applied
to automobile negligence cases, can be as confusing as the
dissenting judge in the principal case thought, and when
not essential to an opinion may well be omitted.
State v. Belle Isle Cab Co. is another point in the line
of cases in a previous article in the REVIEW concerning
statutory right of way as applied to motorist and pedes-
trians.0 In that article, illustrated by a series of Maryland
automobile negligence cases, it was pointed out that al-
though the pedestrian is given his preferential right of way
at intersections as provided by statute, 1 the motorist has
difficulty in obtaining the "right of way" between the
Shalvitz v. Etmanski, 164 Md. 125, 164 A. 168 (1933).
Ibid, 126:.
"The Court Instructs the jury that even if they find that there was
want of ordinary care and caution on the part of the plaintiff, yet he is
entitled to recover, provided they find that the agent or servant of the
defendant could have avoided striking the plaintiff down by the exer-
cise of ordinary care, after he saw, or by the use of ordinary care
might have seen, that the plaintiff was walking on the street and in
danger of being struck by the truck."
Due and Bishop, Motorsta and Pedeatrians, 11 Md. L. Rev. 1 (1950).
Supra, n. 4:
"All pedestrians shall have the right-of-way at street crossings in
the towns and cities of this State, except where traffic is controlled at
such crossings by traffic officers, or traffic control devices. Between
street crossings in such towns and cities, vehicles shall have the right
of way."
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street crossings that the statute says he is entitled to. In
the principal case the Court of Appeals cited the statute
referred to, noted the fact that the accident had not occurred
at an intersection, as the pedestrian was not within the area
that would have marked the pedestrian's right of way, but
failed to base the decision on any statutory right of way.
It is still not known exactly how far the Court will go in
vindicating a motorist who exercises his right of way
between intersections, as the Court decided that the truck
driver was not guilty of negligence under the circumstances,
but determined that the question of negligence of a taxi
driver who just a few feet behind him should be decided by
the jury.
